Well known to the public is China’s effort and achievements in space exploration with the orbiting of its first artificial Earth satellite Dong Fang Hong 1 in 1970, and the subsequent application satellite launches, and the more recent success in its manned programme since 2003 which saw Chinese astronauts entering space and the construction of a temporarily man-tended orbital station Tiangong 1 in Earth orbit. However, little has been discussed about the early days of the Chinese rocket and space programme, which emerged in the 1960s as a spinoff of the Chinese strategic nuclear weapon programme.
China’s Industrialisation in the 50’s
It is widely believed that gunpowder was first invented by ancient Chinese in the 9th century, originally used as fireworks to scare away evil spirits and later in military applications. The earliest gunpowder-based weapons and explosives were used by the Imperial Chinese Army as early as the 12th century. Unfortunately, over the next several hundred years a fast expanding Europe began to overtake the Middle Kingdom as the major economic and industrial world power. By the time the Industrial Revolution had led to the birth of the rocket propulsion technology in the early 20th century, China was descending into endless internal turmoil and conflicts.
When the Chinese Communists took the power and founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China remained largely an agricultural country with near non-existent industrial infrastructure and technological capability. The Chinese leadership decided to seek help from the Soviet Union. In December 1949, Chinese leader Mao Zedong travelled to Moscow to meet Joseph Stalin. The next February, the two leaders officially signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Under the treaty, the Soviet government agreed to supply the urgently needed financial assistance and technical expertise to help the PRC industrialise and modernise.
Under the advice of Soviet advisers, the PRC opted to follow the Soviet model of economic development. The country’s First Five-Year Plan that ran from 1953 to 1957 set up ambitious goals in industries and economic growth, with primary emphasis on heavy industry and advanced technology. Moscow provided US$300 million in loans and sold equipment for 156 key Chinese industrial projects, including steel complexes, mines, oil refineries, petrochemical plants, motor and tractor factories, and general machinery factories. Several thousand Soviet engineers, scientists, technicians and planners were working in China to provide technical assistance and consultancy in planning and developing these projects.
PRC postage stamps issued in 1955, titled “Strive for Completing the 1st Five-Year Plan”
The First Five-Year Plan was a success in term of economic growth, with a solid foundation created in heavy industry. The nation’s output in coal, steel, pig iron, oil, cement, and chemical fertiliser had all multiplied. Thousands of industrial and mining enterprises were constructed. Industrial production increased at an average annual rate of 19 percent between 1952 and 1957, and national income grew at a rate of 9 percent a year. Despite a lack of state investment in agriculture, agricultural output also increased substantially, averaging increases of about 4 percent a year during the same period, mainly due to gains in efficiency brought about through collectivisation.
In 1949, there were no more than 50,000 scientific and technological professionals in China, of which only 500 were engaged in scientific research, and there were only some 40 scientific institutions across the whole country. The China Academy of Sciences (CAS) was established a month after the founding of the PRC. By 1956, a total of 840 scientific and technological research institutes had been set up, covering a wide range of scientific and industrial sectors. The number of scientific and technological professionals had increased to over 400,000.
Decision to Develop Strategic Nuclear Weapon
The Chinese political leadership took the decision to embark on a programme to develop an independent strategic nuclear force sometime in 1953—54. In October 1954, during his first visit to China after becoming the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev was asked by Chinese leader whether the Soviet Union could provide assistance to help the country create a nuclear weapon programme. Khrushchev politely declined the request on the ground that the PRC did not have the industrial capabilities and financial strength to support such a programme, and that the Soviet Union could provide the PRC with a reliable nuclear umbrella. Instead, Khrushchev offered to help China with the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The Chinese leadership’s decision to seek nuclear weapon came as the result of painful lessons learned through their confrontations with a nuclear-armed United States in the early 1950s. During the early stage of the Korean War in 1950—51, U.S. military planners repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapon against Chinese and North Korean forces. During the subsequent Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954—55, once again the Pentagon recommended the use of nuclear weapons to stop a possible Chinese invasion of the Taiwan Island. In both occasions the Soviet government refused to offer their nuclear guarantee. Chinese political and military leaders therefore concluded that only an independent nuclear force could deter American’s nuclear blackmail against China.
In Spring 1956, the Chinese leadership called for a “March to Modern Science and Technology”, a national campaign to advance China’s scientific and technological capabilities. Under the instructions of Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, the State Council established the Science Planning Commission with the task to draw up China’s first long-term R&D blueprint — the 12-Year Programme for Scientific and Technological Development (1956—1967). The plan, drafted by 800 Chinese scientists and Soviet advisers over a period of six months, covered 616 research projects in 57 key areas of science and technology, including nuclear and modern jet (rocket) propulsion technology.
While China’s nuclear weapon research was still in theoretical study stage, the Chinese leadership already began to consider the nuclear delivery system. China’s obsolete aviation industry was incapable of producing modern bomber aircraft that could penetrate enemy air defence to deliver the nuclear bomb. As a result, Chinese military planners followed the Soviet route to choose the ballistic missile as the means to deliver nuclear weapon. During his meeting with the Soviet chief military adviser in China on 12 January 1956, the Chinese defence minister General Peng Dehuai revealed that the PLA was planning to develop military rocketry technology and requested Soviet assistance.
In August 1956, the Director of the Chinese State Planning Commission Li Fuchun wrote to the Soviet Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Nikolai Bulganin officially requesting for immediate Soviet assistance in the establishment and development of a Chinese missile programme. Much to their disappointment, a month later the Soviet government replied suggesting that China should start with educating relevant missile and rocket engineers, before establishing research and development institutions and manufacturing enterprises. Moscow agreed to send Soviet missile professionals to teach in Chinese universities, and accept 50 Chinese students to study missile-related subjects in Soviet universities.
Return of Dr Qian Xuesen
Rocketry research is generally regarded a collective effort, requiring the involvement of a large number of individuals and organisations across many different scientific disciplines. However, it cannot be denied that a small number of key individuals often play a pivotal role in a country’s rocketry and space effort. Just as Russia has Sergei Korolev and the United States has Wernher von Braun, China also has its leading figure in the development of rocket technology — Dr Qian Xuesen.
Qian was born in 1911 in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province in China. He graduated from Chiao Tung University in Shanghai in 1934 and received a Bachelor degree in mechanical engineering. He spent an internship in Nanchang Air Force Base but left China in August 1935 on a Boxer Rebellion Indemnity Scholarship to study mechanical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). A year later he graduated with a MSc degree and then went to the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) to conduct research under Theodore von Kármán. He was awarded his doctorate from Caltech in 1939.
Dr Qian Xuesen, an MIT-educated rocket scientist and one of the founders of the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) at CalTech, father of Chinese rocketry and space programme
During his time in Caltech, Qian earned his reputation as a leading rocket scientist and played a key role in early United States’ efforts to exploit jet and rocket propulsion in the 1940s. He co-founded the famous Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in 1943. In the aftermath of World War II, Qian and Von Kármán were sent to Germany to investigate Nazi wartime rocketry research. There he inspected research facilities and interviewed German scientists including Wernher von Braun. In 1949, Qian applied the knowledge he had learned in Germany to develop an intercontinental spaceplane concept, which inspired later studies on winged spacecraft including the Space Shuttle.
When the Korean War broke out, Qian became a victim of widespread red scares under McCarthyism. His security clearance was revoked in June 1950, making it impossible for him to continue his research at Caltech. He was then questioned and later detained by the FBI for allegedly joining the Communist Party. He spent the next five years in house arrest, being prohibited to either continue his research or leave the United States. In June 1955, Qian appealed through his connections to the PRC government for help. After Beijing agreed to release 11 U.S. Air Force prisoners of war, Qian was allowed to return to China via Hong Kong in October 1955.
Upon his return, Qian was asked by Chinese military leaders including Marshal Nie Rongzhen and General Chen Geng to help set up a missile programme, to which he swiftly agreed. In February 1956, Qian presented a report to the CCP’s Central Committee outlining a detailed plan for developing China’s rocketry and missile technology, including the creation of a dedicated missile R&D institution and relevant management body within the government and military echelons. Qian’s plan was soon approved by the political leadership and put into action. In October 1956, Qian was appointed the director of the Ministry of National Defence’s Fifth Academy in charge of China’s rocketry research and development.
Qian was not the only one who have returned to China from overseas. In fact, even before they took power the Chinese Communists had already begun to secretively recruit from Western educated Chinese scientists living overseas, especially those with expertise in nuclear technology and rocketry. In the early 1950s, the PRC government publicly called for overseas Chinese scholars to return to the motherland to join the ‘socialist construction’. Between 1949 and 1955, a total of 1,536 Chinese scholars returned from overseas, including 1,041 from the United States.
